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criminally punishable. Lord Mansfield pointed out that bare in-
tention is not sufficient to constitute a criminal offense, yet when
this malicious and unlawful intent is coupled with an act designed
to further this intent, the act becomes criminal and punishable.
The doctrine of criminal attempt was firmly established by the
year 1837 so that Baron Parke was able to declare in Rex v.
Roderick that "an attempt to commit a misdemeanor is a mis-
demeanor, whether the offense is created by statute, or was an
offense at common law."'1 The better authority seems to point to
the conclusion that a doctrine of criminal attempt did not exist
as a part of the English common law through the year 1607.
In concluding, it is clear that the Colorado court has not
chosen to follow the lead of the English courts. No new commo4
law crimes will be added to that body of English common law
which was adopted as it existed in 1607. The court seems to be
following the trend toward abolition of common law crimes com-
pletely, which has been accomplished by leglislative act in several
states. The court indicates that only civil aspects of the common
law will continue to be dynamic and constantly changing.
THE TAXPAYER'S MOTIVE
VICTORIA M. DOWNS *
Visintainer v. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue' is a
tenth circuit case decided last March. That an equitable result
was reached, is indisputable, but the successful outcome seems
to have been reached despite, rather than because of, the applica-
tion by the court of an anomalous philosophy presently rampant
in the realm of taxation. Legal concepts when interpreted in tax
contexts are sometimes metamorphosed to such an extent that
although they may bear the same nomenclature as in other fields
of the law, they are opposed in essence. By interpolating the phrase,
"for tax purposes" the courts supplant time honored principles
and precedents, and such concepts as "gifts", "trusts", "corpora-
tions", and "partnerships" may assume entirely new definitions.
Nor are their tax-wise meanings necessarily consistent with each
other, for the standard which guides the courts is not always an
objective one, but is dependent on the taxpayer's subjective atti-
tude, labeled by the court as his "motive". Such relativism in the
application of justice is contrary to the tenets of a system, the
essence of which is a government by laws not subject to change
in each distinct context.
In the Visintainer case, the taxpayer, Louis Visintainer,
brought petition against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
to have reviewed a decision of the Tax Court of the United States 2
approving an income tax deficiency for the period January 1 to
107 C&P 795, 179 Eng. Rep. 347 (1837).
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October 31, 1942, and for the fiscal years ending October 31, 1944
and 1945.
Visintainer owned a large ranch, and in October, 1942, gave
five hundred ewes with lambs to each of his four children. With
the children's assistance he branded their initials on the sheep
in oil paint, and he then executed bills of sale and listed the sheep
in the names of the children in the records of the tax assessor.
Visintainer also made gift-tax returns to the United States and
to the state of Colorado, and subsequently paid the taxes. The
children's sheep were left to run with Visintainer's herd. After
shearing, the wool of the children's sheep was not separated from
that of Visintainer's own sheep. Although the children frequently
discussed their sheep, their profits and their losses, Visintainer
did all the work in connection with them, including the sale of the
sheep, and of the wool, and the purchase of the supplies. Except
in the case of tle oldest child, no separate bank accounts were
kept for the children, but some of the children's money was in-
vested in government bonds in their names. As they were in school,
the children never worked in on the ranch, except for the son who
assumed some managerial duties when he had vacation from his
schooling.
The issue: Was the income from the children's sheep tax-
able to Visintainer despite his attempt to transfer them to the
children,
MOTIVES OF TAXPAYER QUESTIONED
The court found that all the elements ordinarily sufficient to
constitute a gift in the eyes of the law were present. It did not,
however, bring its decision to a close at that point, but deemed it
incumbent upon itself to find that the taxpayer's frame of mind
was the proper one, that is, that his motive was not solely the
avoidance of taxes. The court looked further than to the external
ingredients normally ample as prerequisites of a gift, and added
a strictly subjective element, the proper motive of the taxpayer,
or at least the lack of an improper one. It succeeded in finding
this nebulous factor extant to the appropriate degree:
The case should be decided upon the importance and
reasonable construction of the arrangement rather than
upon the failure to move the sheep from the ranch and
supervision of the taxpayer and the failure to deposit
in separate bank accounts of the children the revenues
derived from the operation of the sheep. Considered in
the light of all the facts and circumstances, we fail to
find in the transaction the conventional badges of a device
to evade income taxes. The facts and circumstances negate
the view that the gifts were merely a colorable subterfuge
to reduce income taxes. To say that the gifts were in-
effective for income tax purposes would be the equivalent
of holding that a father is disenabled to make a gift to
DICTA
Feb., 1952
his minor child which is effective in point of tax conse-
quences if he retains or subsequently exercises any con-
trol or management of the property or fruits therefrom
solely for the benefit of the child. Neither the letter nor
the spirit of revenue legislation extends its reach that far.
A fifth circuit case, Alexander et al. v. Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue,3 decided subsequent to the Visintainer case, pre-
sented very nearly identical facts. The court reached the same
result, though by a different analysis and without reference to
the motives of the taxpayer. The decision was a reversal of the
Tax Court's ruling, the substance of which was that in reaching
its decision the Tax Court too narrowly interpreted the rule stated
in Lucas v. Earl 4 that income is taxable to him who earns, losing
sight of the principle that income may be "earned" not only by
individual personal effort, but also by the employment of invested
capital, which may be managed by another person for the benefit
of the owner; and that when the parties are acting in good faith,
there is no objection inherent in the fact that the owner and man-
ager are members of the same family.
TAx THE TREE AND NOT THE FRUIT
In Lucas v. Earl, the focal point of the discussion in the
Alexander case, the taxpayer and his wife made a contract under
which each took half of all the earnings the other would receive.
Although the contract was declared to be a perfectly legal one for
tax purposes, as for any other, the decision said that the revenue
act places the tax upon the tree that really bears the fruit, and
what happens subsequently to the fruit is of no consequence in
determining who is taxable, so the husband was taxed on his
entire earnings.
The Alexander case, then, was decided on the narrow point
of whether the child or the father was the true earner. The court
decided that the child's capital which was given him by his father
in order to buy the livestock, "earned" the taxable income.
The doctrine that the court must find a sufficiently lofty mo-
tive in every transaction where tax questions are concerned, and
that the transaction is not bona fide if it is for the sole purpose
of avoiding taxes, has many facets and has wended its way into
various linguistic forms. One of the favorite exercises of the
courts when thinking in terms of taxes is to "look through the
form to the substance." Such perspicacity is thoroughly warranted
when the court is regarding the substance of the transaction as
distinguished from the nomenclature given it by the parties. How-
ever, the distinction between form and substance seems invalid
when it is said that the substance is incompatible with the form
because the motive is not the usual one but is for the purpose of
lower taxes.
'190 F. 2d 153 (1951).
4281 C.S. 111 (1930).
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In Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.5 the court found that
the motive to achieve lower taxes rendered the transaction in
question one merely formal without bona fide substance. The case
embodies the fallacy of the Visintainer case. The Court Holding
Co. case deals with an attempt to dissolve a corporation befor6
sale of its assets to avoid the tax to the corporation.
In essence, the court said that although the sale of assets
would be valid for other purposes, it is not valid when tainted
with "the conventional badges of a device to evade income taxes"
described in the Visintainer case. An answer to this specious
argument concerning motives is contained in United States v. Cum-
berland Public Service Co.,6 a case whose facts resemble those
of the Court Holding Company case. The court said:
Whatever the motive and however relevant it may be
in determining if the action was real or a sham, shares of
physical properties by shareholders following a genuine
liquidation distribution cannot be attributed to the cor-
poration for taxation purposes.
By the same taken, it may be asked why the court in the Visintainer
case considered whether the gifts which were gifts in fact, were
or were not "a subterfuge to reduce income taxes."
INDEPENDENT PURPOSE DOCTRINE
Another sophistic ramification of the same basic theory, that
transactions are invalid if the motives behind them are the reduc-
tion of taxes, is known as the Independent Purpose Doctrine. Its
scope may best be illustrated by the case of Gregory v. Helvering.7
There, the court said that the taxpayer's purpose was to pay her-
self a stock dividend to avoid taxes, and that since she had no
"independent purpose" other than the avoidance of taxes, such
would not be countenanced. The court came to this decision in
spite of the fact that the taxpayer had followed the Revenue Act,
Section 112g to the letter. As owner of all the stock of the United
Mortgage Corporation, which in turn held a thousand shares of
the Monitor Securities Corporation, she organized a third corpora-
tion, the Averill Corporation, which took the shares of the Monitor
Corporation, and was subsequently dissolved. All its assets went
to the taxpayer who sold them, believing she would diminish her
income taxes. The court declared the transactions ineffective for
tax purposes.
CONCLUSION
How far the courts will go in such subjective examinations
to determine the taxpayer's state of mind, it is hard to say. At
any rate, in its changed role as psychologist from that of judge,
the court necessarily has departed from what was once stated as
a truism, "For law we have a measure, know what to trust to."
To a taxpayer, like Visintainer, no measure exists.
5 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
6 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
1203 U.S. 465 (1935).
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